CVE-2026-90817CVSS 9.8 CriticalCISA KEV · added 18 Nov 2026REDCap 13.3.0 and later~12 min read

Every REDCap survey link you send out is a key to the front door. With CVE-2026-90817, that key is enough to run code on the server. An attacker who knows one valid public survey hash, the token in an ordinary survey URL, can reach REDCap’s administrative Data Import tool with no login, overwrite a compiled template and get remote code execution. Unit 42 has already seen it used to plant cryptominers, and CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 18 November 2026. The federal deadline of 21 November has now passed.

REDCap is the research data platform from Vanderbilt University. The project’s own site counts more than 8,500 partner institutions in 167 countries. It’s often run by a research group rather than central IT. Someone stands it up on a VM for a study, and it quietly collects clinical and survey data for years. That’s exactly the profile attackers like.

9.8CVSS 3.1 base score
1valid survey hash is all an attacker needs
13.3.0+every release from 13.3.0 is affected
KEVactively exploited, forensic triage required

Key takeaways

  • Affected: REDCap 13.3.0 and higher, per the NVD record.
  • Fixed in: 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS and 17.4.4 Standard. Upgrade to one of these or later.
  • Pre-condition: a valid public survey hash, which is in every survey link you have ever sent.
  • In the wild: Unit 42 observed attackers abusing public survey endpoints to deploy evasive cryptomining payloads.
  • Patching isn’t cleanup: an upgrade closes the door but won’t remove a miner or persistence that’s already there.

01What happened

The flaw was published on 20 September 2026 (NVD), reported by the research firm Securifera. On 27 September, Securifera’s researcher published a full write-up of the exploit chain. One detail worth noting: he found the bug by pointing an AI coding agent at a leaked copy of the REDCap source. That’s the world we’re in now. Bugs in “obscure” software get found faster than they used to.

Palo Alto’s Unit 42 then reported in-the-wild exploitation, with attackers abusing public survey endpoints to bypass admin access controls and deploy cryptomining payloads. On 18 November, CISA added the flaw to the KEV catalog in the same batch as the Apache Axis bug behind the Confluence attacks I covered earlier. The entry carries a forensic triage requirement, so federal agencies have to check for compromise as well as patch.

REDCap CVE-2026-90817 timeline: CVE published 20 Sep, Securifera write-up 27 Sep, Unit 42 attacks October, CISA KEV 18 Nov, deadline 21 Nov 2026
Exploitation followed the public write-up within weeks. The KEV listing came about two months after disclosure.

02How the exploit chain works

This isn’t one bug. Securifera describes five ordinary-looking weaknesses that only become dangerous together:

  1. A double decode opens the route. The public survey handler has a “passthrough” feature that may load the root dispatcher only for the PDF route. The allowlist check URL-decodes __passthru twice, while the route restriction compares the once-decoded value. Send %2569ndex.php and one check sees index.php while the other doesn’t, so the attacker picks any controller, such as DataImportController:index.
  2. Rights are calculated too early. REDCap builds the user-rights object before the survey identity exists, and treats an undefined super-user flag as “super user”. The anonymous survey visitor inherits the Data Import privilege, and CSRF checks are skipped.
  3. A filename becomes a PHP stream. Data Import trusts the posted fname value as a local path, so it accepts php://filter URIs.
  4. A BOM clean-up becomes a write. The CSV routine strips a byte-order mark and writes the result back to the same resource. A crafted filter chain turns that into an exact overwrite.
  5. A template cache becomes code execution. The overwrite targets a predictable, writable compiled Blade template, which the application later includes as PHP.
Animation of the reported chain: a public survey link with a double-encoded __passthru parameter reaches the Data Import controller with super-user rights; a php filter stream in fname overwrites a Blade cache file, which runs as PHP and is used to install an XMRig miner posing as syslog-ng with cron and SSH key persistence. ATTACK CHAIN · CVE-2026-90817 LIVE REPLAY Survey link public hash only no login __passthru %2569ndex.php double decode Data Import super-user rights no CSRF check fname stream php://filter chain BOM write-back Blade cache overwritten → PHP runs Remote code execution as the web server user OBSERVED PAYLOAD web shell → XMRig miner posing as syslog-ng → cron + SSH key persistence ① A request carries a public survey hash: no login needed ② %2569ndex.php slips past the double-decode check ③ The survey visitor inherits Data Import super-user rights ④ php://filter in fname overwrites a compiled Blade template ⑤ The template runs as PHP: web shell, then a disguised miner
Animated replay: five small defects, one chain, from a survey request to code execution.
AttributeDetail
CVECVE-2026-90817
ScoreCVSS 3.1 9.8 · AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
WeaknessCWE-94 code injection, CWE-73 external control of file name or path
ComponentSurvey passthrough routing and Data Import processing
AffectedREDCap 13.3.0 and higher
Fixed in16.0.49 LTS · 17.3.10 LTS · 17.4.4 Standard
Pre-conditionKnowledge of a valid public survey hash
CISA KEVAdded 18 Nov 2026 · due 21 Nov 2026 · forensic triage required

03Am I affected?

If you run REDCap 13.3.0 or later and haven’t upgraded to a fixed release, assume yes. The “survey hash” requirement is not a real barrier. Surveys are meant to be public, and the hash is in every invitation email, SMS and QR code your study ever sent out.

REDCap CVE-2026-90817 affected versions and fixes: 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS, 17.4.4 Standard
Pick the fixed release on your track, LTS or Standard, then hunt for compromise.
If REDCap is 13.3.0 or later and unpatched, upgrade to 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS or 17.4.4 Standard. If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict public surveys and block survey-context access to the dispatcher, Data Import and Parcel controllers. In every case, hunt for miners and persistence. REMEDIATION DECISION FLOW REDCap 13.3.0 or later? No Not in range: still upgrade Yes Can you upgrade today? Yes No Upgrade to a fixed release 16.0.49 LTS · 17.3.10 LTS · 17.4.4 Standard Contain: restrict public surveys block survey access to dispatcher, Data Import, Parcel Either way: hunt for miners, web shells, cron jobs and new SSH keys
Upgrade if you can. Contain if you can’t. Hunt in both cases.

04What attackers are doing

Unit 42 reported attackers using public survey endpoints to bypass admin controls and drop evasive cryptocurrency mining payloads. Public write-ups of that campaign describe a familiar pattern. A single request stages a short-lived web shell. An in-memory loader then fetches XMRig disguised as image files and renames the miner to look like syslog-ng. Persistence comes from cron and an added SSH key.

Cryptomining sounds like a nuisance. I’d treat it as a symptom. Whoever ran the miner had code execution on a server holding research participants’ data, and an SSH key that will outlive your patch. CISA lists ransomware use as “unknown”. Don’t plan around that word.

The University of Florida’s CTS-IT team has published a read-only scanner, redcap_cve_2026_90817_scan. It checks a host for the campaign’s artefacts, including the miner’s local API socket on 127.0.0.1:50001, the syslog-ng masquerade and cron persistence, without sending any exploit traffic.

05What you should do today

  1. Find every REDCap instance. Ask research departments, not just IT. Check DNS, certificates and your firewall NAT rules for anything answering on a survey URL. Departmental VMs and “pilot” servers are the usual blind spot.
  2. Upgrade to a fixed release. 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS or 17.4.4 Standard, or anything later on your track. Do it out of cycle. A KEV listing with exploitation is the change window.
  3. If you truly can’t upgrade today, contain. Securifera’s guidance is to restrict or disable public surveys and block survey-context access to the root dispatcher, DataImportController and ParcelController. A WAF rule for encoded __passthru values helps. Treat all of this as temporary.
  4. Hunt, even after patching. Look in web logs for encoded __passthru values and survey requests to DataImportController:index or ParcelController:show, for fname values containing php:// or filter strings, unexpected changes under REDCap’s temp/cache folders, child processes of the web server account, unexplained CPU load, new cron entries and new keys in authorized_keys. Run the CTS-IT scanner.
  5. If anything turns up, treat it as a breach. Isolate the server, preserve evidence, rotate database and service credentials, and assess what participant data was reachable. My notes on the first 60 minutes of an incident apply here too.
  6. Put research platforms under IT governance. Same patch SLA, same monitoring, same asset register as everything else. I made the same argument about clinical devices in what DICOM and HL7 taught me about unpatchable devices.

06How PrahiX ORA could have saved you

To be clear first: no platform rewrites REDCap’s code. Only the upgrade does that. But look at the timeline. Securifera’s write-up was public from 27 September, and the KEV listing only came on 18 November. In between, attackers were planting miners on exposed servers. Research platforms like this often sit outside central IT’s view, on a lab’s VM with nobody watching the logs. That blind spot is exactly what PrahiX ORA is built to close. Servers, applications, logs and the personal data behind them land in one place, and RAYA AI turns the fragments into one incident with its cause.

Illustrative animation. Left: web logs, the research team, the NOC and the database owner each hold a fragment and nobody connects them. Right: the same signals flow into PrahiX ORA, RAYA AI correlates them into one incident with its cause and the participant data at risk, and the host is isolated after approval. WITHOUT ORA · 4 SILOS WITH PRAHIX ORA · ONE INCIDENT Web server logs?__passthru=%2569ndex.php · unread Research team“Is that VM ours or central IT’s?” NOC monitorCPU 100% on redcap-vm · ticket P4 DatabaseParticipant data: what is in there? 1 6 ? Miner + SSH key stay. Exposure unknown. Web/app logs Processes Server metrics Databases (DP) ORA + RAYA AI P1 · ONE CORRELATED INCIDENT Survey request → web worker spawns a shell → CPU spike Cause: CVE-2026-90817 · participant IDs in reach Host isolated · breach clock on ✓ Approved by SOC lead Illustrative scenario based on the reported REDCap campaign
Same attack, two outcomes. On the left, four silos each hold a fragment. On the right, ORA correlates them and RAYA contains the attack. Illustrative scenario.

Stage by stage: what ORA would have done

What the attacker didWhat ORA and RAYA do
Weeks before: an unpatched REDCap on a departmental VM, survey links publicIngest + awareness. PrahiX Uni puts servers, VMs, databases and applications on the Central Console, with topology discovered automatically, so the lab’s REDCap box is in the inventory. GRC auto-ingests CERT-In advisories, so “which of our servers runs this?” has an answer early.
Initial access: encoded __passthru survey request reaches Data ImportCorrelate. Web and application logs arrive within 10 seconds. A Sigma detection mapped to MITRE ATT&CK can flag encoded __passthru values or php:// in fname, and IOC matching from 10+ threat-intel feeds covers known attacker infrastructure.
Code execution: Blade template overwritten, the web worker spawns a shellAttack storylines build a graph of processes, hosts, files and connections that rebuilds the kill chain from the first request. UEBA scores the web server’s new behaviour as high risk.
Miner running as fake syslog-ng, with cron and SSH key persistenceRAYA AI early warning flags trouble 15–45 minutes before users feel it, so a CPU pinned at 3 a.m. becomes part of the same incident instead of a separate P4 ticket. Honeypots and canary files fire a playbook if the intruder goes exploring.
What data was in reach?PrahiX Data Protection scans databases down to column level for 14 Indian identifiers, including Aadhaar, PAN and mobile numbers, with a 0–100 risk score. You know what participant data sat behind the server before a regulator asks.
RespondRAYA runs the containment you allowed: isolate the host, block the address. An approval gate sits on anything disruptive, and every step lands in one immutable audit trail, which is the evidence a forensic-triage requirement asks for.
After: regulator and ethics committee questionsGRC starts the breach clocks when the incident is logged (CERT-In 6 hours, DP Board 72 hours) and drafts reports mapped to CERT-In and the DPDP Act. Evolve: each outcome makes the next response faster.
How PrahiX ORA, Uni, Data Protection and RAYA AI would contain REDCap CVE-2026-90817
Four stages of the REDCap attack, four documented PrahiX capabilities.

What’s inside PrahiX ORA

ORA platform

Collects every signal from any vendor or format, ties it to an asset, site and user, and runs four automatic steps: Ingest → Correlate → Respond → Evolve.

RAYA AI

The agent inside ORA. It joins related alerts into one incident with a root cause, self-heals within your limits and rolls back a failed fix. It also warns 15–45 minutes before users feel a problem and writes a plain-language morning summary.

Central Console & Dashboards

Every site, device and service live on one screen. Role-based views and a library of ready-made dashboards let you go from a chart to an incident, device or log line in one click.

GRC

Tracks CERT-In, DPDP Act, RBI, SEBI CSCRF, IRDAI, ISO 27001 and more. It shows what’s due and what’s missing, and produces sealed evidence and ready-to-submit reports.

PrahiX Uni

Monitoring, AIOps, SIEM, SOAR and self-healing in one product: Sigma detections mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, UEBA, attack storylines, deception, playbooks with approval gates and 180 days of searchable logs.

PrahiX Data Protection

Finds personal data (14 Indian identifiers) and stops leakage across 12 channels. It also tracks every DPDP Act clock, with 62 controls on one scorecard.

Integrations

REST APIs and webhooks to the tools you already run. Parser Lab adds any source in any format, and detections and playbooks are kept as version-controlled code.

Built for India

Multi-tenant from one site to 100+ client tenants, with India compliance built in plus CIS v8, NIST CSF, PCI-DSS, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2 mappings. Made in India.

70%less alert noise, up to (PrahiX figure)
15–45 minearly warning before users feel it
65%faster to find the cause, up to
10 slog freshness · 180 days retained

The honest bottom line

ORA would not have patched REDCap. It would have put the forgotten research server in the inventory, turned the first odd survey request into a P1 incident with its cause already written, and tied the miner’s CPU spike to that incident instead of a separate ticket. It would also have told you which participant data was in reach. The upgrade and the clean-up still belong to your team. ORA makes sure you are never the last to know. P J Networks is an implementation partner for PrahiX, and we run ORA deployments end to end. Book an ORA demo with us.

07The India angle

Wherever REDCap runs, in India as anywhere else, it tends to live under a study’s grant rather than a central IT budget. That’s the worst combination for a bug like this: internet-facing by design, holding personal data, and maintained when someone remembers to.

The legal stakes are rising too. Under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 and the DPDP Rules 2025, research institutions acting as Data Fiduciaries carry a duty of reasonable security safeguards. Most obligations apply from May 2027. CERT-In’s six-hour incident reporting rule already applies today. If a REDCap server holding participant data was compromised, you need to be able to show when you found out and what you did. Logs and an asset register are what make that possible.

08Frequently asked questions

Which REDCap versions fix CVE-2026-90817?

16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS and 17.4.4 Standard. Every release from 13.3.0 onward is affected until upgraded to a fixed release on its track.

Does an attacker need a REDCap login?

No. They need a valid public survey hash, which is part of every public survey link. That’s why this is effectively an unauthenticated remote code execution bug.

We patched. Are we safe?

Patching closes the entry point but doesn’t remove anything an attacker already installed. Hunt for web shells, XMRig processes posing as syslog-ng, new cron jobs and unknown SSH keys, and review web logs for encoded __passthru requests.

What can we do if we cannot upgrade immediately?

Restrict or disable public surveys and block survey-context access to the root dispatcher, the Data Import controller and the Parcel controller. Treat that as temporary containment and upgrade as soon as possible.

Not sure whether your research servers are clean?

My team at P J Networks can find every REDCap and research-facing server you run, check versions, run the compromise hunt and set up monitoring with PrahiX, so the next research-platform CVE reaches you as an alert rather than a breach notice.

Request a security assessment →

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