Attackers are actively exploiting a critical unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in Atlassian Confluence Data Center — and with more than 1.2 million internet-facing Confluence instances visible to Censys, the blast radius is enormous. CVE-2026-90436 traces back to an end-of-life Apache component that Atlassian has shipped for years, and Rapid7’s managed detection team caught exploitation in a customer environment on November 13, 2026. If your team runs Confluence Data Center with the legacy Remote API enabled, this is an emergency-patch scenario — not a “schedule it next sprint” one.

Key Takeaways

  • CVE-2026-90436 is a critical RCE in Atlassian Confluence Data Center versions 1.x–9.x when the Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) is enabled.
  • CVSS score: 9.3 (Atlassian / CVSS 4.0) or 9.8 (CISA ADP / CVSS 3.1) — both firmly in the Critical range.
  • Root cause: an end-of-life Apache Axis 1.x SOAP library with an unsafe reflection bug that Apache itself will not patch.
  • Active exploitation confirmed by Rapid7 MDR on November 13, 2026; a public PoC also exists.
  • Fixed in Confluence Data Center 9.2.28; upgrading to 10.x also eliminates the attack surface because the feature was removed entirely.
  • Atlassian Cloud is not affected; on-premises installations must act now.
  • Immediate mitigation: disable the Remote API setting and verify the SOAP endpoint returns HTTP 403.

What Is CVE-2026-90436 and Why Does It Matter Right Now?

When Apache disclosed CVE-2026-90436 on November 6, 2026, it targeted a niche SOAP library that most developers had long forgotten. Apache Axis 1.x — a SOAP framework that reached end-of-life over a decade ago — harbours an unsafe reflection vulnerability in its SOAP-fault handling that allows an unauthenticated attacker to instantiate arbitrary Java classes on the server. Because Apache has explicitly stated it will not release a patched version of Axis 1.x, the fix must come from every vendor who ships the library themselves.

Atlassian is one of those vendors. Confluence Data Center has bundled Apache Axis 1.x for its XML-RPC and Remote API functionality since version 1.x. That feature — originally designed for tight integrations with legacy systems and automation scripts — is now a loaded gun pointed at any Confluence server that left it enabled.

Seven days after Apache’s disclosure, Rapid7 MDR detected a real-world attack. That seven-day window from public advisory to weaponised exploitation is a stark reminder: for high-severity flaws in widely deployed enterprise software, attackers move before most organisations even complete their patch-cycle planning.

Technical Breakdown: How the Attack Works

The flaw lives in Apache Axis 1.x’s SOAP-fault deserialization path. When Confluence’s Remote API receives a specially crafted SOAP request containing a malformed fault block, Axis reflects the classname named in the fault back into Class.forName() — without any whitelist or sanitisation. An attacker can supply a classname whose static initialiser or constructor performs a dangerous action when loaded.

Out of the box, an Axis 1.x server exposes:

  • File creation and truncation — attackers can write or zero out files on the server filesystem.
  • DNS oracle / SSRF — class-loading triggers DNS lookups, confirming server egress and mapping internal infrastructure.
  • Full RCE via gadget chains — when Spring or other compatible libraries are on the classpath (as they are in modern Confluence), attackers chain gadgets (such as Spring CPAC) to achieve OS-level code execution.

Crucially, the attack requires no authentication whatsoever. The Remote API endpoint (/plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2) is reachable by any client that can send an HTTP request to the Confluence port. Censys counted 1,212,568 internet-facing Confluence web interfaces — even a fraction of those with the Remote API enabled represents tens of thousands of immediately vulnerable targets.

Attribute Detail
CVE ID CVE-2026-90436
CVSS Score 9.3 (Atlassian / CVSS 4.0) · 9.8 (CISA ADP / CVSS 3.1)
Affected Product Atlassian Confluence Data Center 1.x–9.x (Remote API enabled)
Root Cause Apache Axis 1.x unsafe reflection in SOAP-fault handling
Authentication None required (unauthenticated RCE)
Fixed Version Confluence Data Center 9.2.28 · Confluence 10.x (feature removed)
Not Affected Atlassian Cloud, Confluence 10.x+
Exploitation Status Active (Rapid7 MDR, Nov 13 2026) · Public PoC exists

Also Affected: N-able N-Central

The Apache Axis 1.x library is not exclusive to Atlassian. N-able N-Central, widely used by managed service providers across India and globally, also bundles Axis 1.x and is reported as exploited in related attacks. If your SOC team manages multiple MSP environments, treat N-Central instances as equally urgent — and check with your MSP vendors for updated advisories. The fact that two enterprise platforms from different vendors share the same end-of-life component underscores a supply-chain hygiene problem the industry has been slow to address.

The India and Asia-Pacific Exposure

Confluence Data Center is widely deployed in Indian IT services firms, government-linked enterprises, and financial institutions for knowledge management, project wikis, and DevOps documentation. Many of these organisations run on-premises installations — often upgraded infrequently due to change-freeze policies or licensing constraints — which means versions 7.x, 8.x, and early 9.x are extremely common in production environments across India. The combination of large internet-exposed attack surfaces and slower patch cycles makes this region a high-priority target for opportunistic threat actors.

India’s CERT-In has historically issued advisories within 24–48 hours of critical Confluence flaws. Organisations should monitor the CERT-In portal and not wait for formal guidance before acting — the exploitation window is already open.

What You Should Do Right Now: Sanjay Seth’s Action Checklist

Having designed and hardened enterprise networks for Indian banks, telcos, and government entities over three decades, here is exactly what I recommend:

  1. Identify all Confluence Data Center instances immediately. Run an internal asset scan. Check your CMDB. Do not assume your team knows every instance — shadow IT and forgotten dev/staging servers are a constant in Indian enterprise environments.
  2. Check whether the Remote API is enabled. In Confluence, go to Administration → General Configuration → Further Configuration. If “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)” is ticked, you are vulnerable and must act today.
  3. Disable the Remote API as an immediate mitigation. Untick the checkbox and save. Then validate: access /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2 — it must return HTTP 403, not 200. This is Atlassian’s own validation step.
  4. Upgrade to Confluence Data Center 9.2.28 or above. Schedule an emergency change window. Atlassian’s official advisory has download links and upgrade guidance.
  5. Block external access to the SOAP endpoint at the perimeter. Even if the Remote API is disabled, add a WAF or firewall rule blocking /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/* from external sources. If you’re running a FortiGate-based zero-trust architecture, push an application-layer policy today.
  6. Hunt for indicators of prior compromise. Check Confluence application logs for unusual POST requests to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/ going back 7 days. Look for unexpected outbound DNS queries, new processes spawned by Confluence, or file creation in unexpected locations.
  7. Notify your incident response team now. If you find any anomalous activity, treat it as a full incident. Post-exploitation on Confluence typically leads to credential harvesting, lateral movement into Jira, Bitbucket, and corporate directories.
  8. Extend the audit to N-able N-Central. If your environment includes N-Central for RMM, check with N-able directly for patch status and apply the same logic.

For organisations running high-availability SD-WAN and segmented enterprise architectures, this is also a prompt to review whether Confluence sits in a properly isolated DMZ segment or directly on the internal network — lateral movement from a compromised Confluence server in a flat network can be catastrophic.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Atlassian Cloud affected by CVE-2026-90436?

No. Atlassian Cloud is not affected because Atlassian manages the infrastructure and has already removed the vulnerable Apache Axis component from cloud deployments. This vulnerability is exclusively an on-premises Confluence Data Center issue.

We disabled the Remote API — are we fully protected?

Disabling the Remote API is the most critical immediate step and closes the attack vector that CVE-2026-90436 exploits. However, disabling it alone does not constitute “fully patched.” You should also upgrade to 9.2.28 to close the underlying library vulnerability, audit logs for signs of prior access, and add WAF rules as a defence-in-depth measure.

What if our Confluence version is too old to upgrade directly to 9.2.28?

Atlassian provides upgrade paths from older versions. The critical first step is disabling the Remote API regardless of your version. For very old deployments (pre-7.x), consider whether these instances hold sensitive data justifying migration to a supported version — or whether they should be decommissioned. Running unsupported software is an unacceptable risk in a regulated environment. Reach out for a remediation roadmap if you need guidance on upgrading legacy Confluence deployments.

Is there a way to detect if we have already been exploited?

Yes. Look for these indicators in your Confluence logs and system logs: (a) unusual POST requests to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2 from external IPs, especially with malformed SOAP bodies; (b) unexpected outbound DNS queries or HTTP calls originating from the Confluence JVM process; (c) new files created in the Confluence working directory or home directory outside of normal update operations; (d) unexpected child processes spawned by the Confluence process (e.g. sh, bash, cmd.exe, powershell.exe). If you find any of these, isolate the server immediately and engage an incident response team.


Get a Security Assessment for Your Confluence Environment

CVE-2026-90436 is a textbook example of why asset visibility, patch management discipline, and defence-in-depth architecture matter. If your organisation needs help auditing Confluence exposure, hardening your network perimeter, or designing a zero-trust architecture that contains the blast radius of exactly this kind of critical RCE — contact Sanjay Seth at P J Networks. With over thirty years of enterprise network security experience across Indian and international clients, we can get your security posture to where it needs to be.

Sources: Atlassian Security Advisory · Rapid7 ETR Report · SecurityOnline · Cyber Daily