CVE-2026-76460CVSS 10.0 · exploitedCISA KEV · added 16 Sep 2026+ CVE-2026-76423 (CVSS 10.0)Cisco ISE / ISE-PIC~11 min read

Cisco ISE CVE-2026-76460 is the kind of bug I hate most: a CVSS 10.0 authentication bypass in the box that decides who gets on your network. Cisco disclosed it on 16 September 2026 and said in the same breath that it was already being exploited. CISA listed it the same day. Two months on, CrowdSec’s sensors are still counting fresh attackers, and I still meet ISE nodes that haven’t been patched.

Cisco also fixed a second CVSS 10.0 flaw, CVE-2026-76423, in the same release cycle. I’ll be precise about it, because a lot of coverage blurred the two: Cisco says it has not seen CVE-2026-76423 exploited. Patch it anyway. The same fixed releases close both.

10.0CVSS 3.1, both CVEs (Cisco)
Day 0exploitation confirmed by Cisco at disclosure
311unique attacking IPs on CrowdSec’s tracker, 28 Oct to 2 Nov
0workarounds; iACLs are a mitigation only

Key takeaways

  • CVE-2026-76460 (CWE-648) lets an unauthenticated attacker reach an ISE API endpoint and bypass the web management interface. Cisco warns attackers may get root command execution.
  • It affects Cisco ISE and ISE-PIC regardless of configuration, and it is in CISA’s KEV catalog with forensic triage required.
  • CVE-2026-76423 is a separate REST API bypass giving admin access to configuration and identity data. Cisco reports no known exploitation.
  • Fixed in: 3.1 Patch 12, 3.2 Patch 11, 3.3 Patch 12, 3.4 Patch 7, 3.5 Patch 4. ISE 3.0 gets no fix, so migrate.
  • Patching isn’t enough. Check every node’s access.log for unexpected usernames and re-image anything suspicious.

01Why an ISE bypass is worse than most

ISE is where your zero-trust policy actually lives. It answers every 802.1X and MAB request, holds the RADIUS and TACACS+ policy for your switches and firewalls, runs posture checks, and stores the admin accounts and certificates that tie it all together. When I design a zero-trust campus, the NAC is the trust broker. Compromise it, and the attacker doesn’t just own one server. They decide who else gets in.

That’s why CISA flagged this one for forensic triage, not just patching. It’s also the third Cisco ISE entry in the KEV catalog, after two critical 2025 flaws (CVE-2025-20281 and CVE-2025-20337). If ISE is in your estate, assume it is on attackers’ target lists.

Cisco ISE CVE-2026-76460 timeline: advisory and CISA KEV 16 Sep, deadline 19 Sep, Nuclei check 23 Oct, CrowdSec 311 IPs by 2 Nov 2026
Cisco found the flaw while resolving a TAC case. By the time the patch existed, attackers were already using it.

02The two flaws, side by side

CVE-2026-76460CVE-2026-76423
Advisorycisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5cisco-sa-ise-multi-hrP9jQSQ
CVSS 3.110.0 Critical10.0 Critical
WeaknessCWE-648, incorrect use of privileged APIsCWE-290, authentication bypass
ImpactUnauthorised access bypassing the web management UI; Cisco notes possible root command executionAdmin access to read and modify ISE configuration and identity data
AffectsISE and ISE-PIC, any configurationISE and ISE-PIC, any configuration
Exploited?Yes: Cisco PSIRT aware; in CISA KEVCisco not aware of malicious use
Found byCisco, during a TAC support caseSTAR Labs SG
Bug IDCSCww39530CSCwu39998

CVE-2026-76423 shipped in a bundle of six. The other five, CVE-2026-76424 through CVE-2026-76428, cover authenticated file upload leading to root, SQL injection and XXE. They need credentials, but chained behind an auth bypass, that’s cold comfort.

03How the attack works

Cisco keeps the details thin, but its CVE description is clear about the shape: insufficient authentication control on an API endpoint means a crafted request bypasses the web-based management interface. Cisco’s own indicator is a fake username such as dummyuser turning up in the API gateway’s access log. That tells you attackers are talking to the API as an identity that was never created.

On 23 October a public Nuclei detection template appeared that reads the active-session list using a made-up cookie. CrowdSec began tagging attempts on 28 October and counted 311 unique IPs by 2 November. As of that report there was no public code reaching root. Cisco, though, says real attackers may already have it, and warns they can hide their tracks once they do.

Animation: an attacker sends a crafted request to a Cisco ISE API endpoint, authentication is bypassed as a user that was never created such as dummyuser, Cisco notes root command execution may be possible, and the attacker then controls the NAC: access policy, admin accounts, identity data and outbound uploads, with logs that can be wiped. ATTACK CHAIN · CVE-2026-76460 LIVE REPLAY Attacker reaches ISE management/API ISE API endpoint crafted request fake user e.g. dummyuser Auth bypassed no credentials possible root (Cisco) Owns the NAC policy, admins, logs can be wiped WHAT AN ATTACKER CAN DO NEXT Rewrite access policy Add rogue admins Read identity data Upload data outward ① Attacker reaches the ISE management/API interface ② Crafted API request as a user that was never created ③ Authentication bypassed; Cisco notes root may be possible ④ The NAC is owned, and its own logs can no longer be trusted ⑤ Policy, admins and identity data are in the attacker’s hands
Why Cisco tells you to check firewall logs outside the ISE box: once attackers have root, the box’s own logs can’t be trusted.

04Patch matrix and the 3.1/3.2 problem

Cisco ISE CVE-2026-76460 and CVE-2026-76423 patch matrix: 3.1 Patch 12, 3.2 Patch 11, 3.3 Patch 12, 3.4 Patch 7, 3.5 Patch 4
Fixed releases from both Cisco advisories. On 3.1 and 3.2 the companion flaws need a migration, not a patch.

Read Cisco’s second advisory closely. On 3.1 and 3.2, the patches close CVE-2026-76460 and CVE-2026-76423, but for the other five flaws in that bundle Cisco’s answer is “migrate to a fixed release“. Both trains are also on Cisco’s end-of-life path. My advice: patch tonight to stop the exploited bug, then book the move to 3.3, 3.4 or 3.5 as a project with a date on it. ISE-PIC customers should note that 3.4 is the last supported PIC release.

On ISE 3.0, migrate. On 3.1 or 3.2, apply Patch 12 or 11 now and plan migration. On 3.3 to 3.5, apply the listed patch. In every case restrict management access with iACLs, check access.log on every node and cross-check firewall logs. REMEDIATION DECISION FLOW Which ISE release? 3.0 No fix: migrate now 3.1 / 3.2 P12 / P11 now, then migrate 3.3 / 3.4 / 3.5 P12 / P7 / P4 IN EVERY CASE iACLs: management and API reachable only from admin networks Check access.log on every node · cross-check firewall logs · re-image if suspicious
Triage every ISE and ISE-PIC node with this flow, including PAN, MnT and PSN personas.

05What you should do today

If you’ve already patched, good. Most of this list still applies, because the flaw was exploited before anyone could patch.

  1. List every ISE and ISE-PIC node with its version and patch level. Include every persona in a distributed deployment, plus lab and DR nodes.
  2. Patch to the fixed release for your train (see the matrix). If you’re on 3.0, start the migration now. There’s nothing to patch.
  3. Lock down management access. Cisco’s own mitigation is infrastructure ACLs that allow only required management and control-plane traffic to ISE. On a FortiGate, that’s an address group for your admin jump hosts and an explicit deny for everything else hitting the ISE admin and API interfaces. It’s also one of the misconfigurations I find on almost every firewall.
  4. Hunt for the indicator on every node. Run show logging application ise-kong/access.log | include dummyuser, then pull a support bundle with debug logs and search ./ise/logs/apigateway/access.log.*.gz for usernames you didn’t create.
  5. Look outside the box. Cisco warns that attackers with root can wipe evidence. Review firewall and flow logs for uploads from ISE to external IPs, or downloads from unknown ones.
  6. If anything looks wrong, re-image. Cisco recommends re-imaging affected nodes and restoring from a known-good configuration backup. Then rotate the admin, RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secrets and AD bind accounts ISE uses. My notes on the first 60 minutes of an incident cover the order of operations.

This isn’t the only Cisco management-plane problem this month. Later the same day I covered CVE-2026-76466, the hard-coded credential that lets attackers root Cisco Expressway clusters. Same lesson: keep management interfaces off reachable networks.

06How PrahiX ORA could have saved you

To be clear first: no platform patches ISE for you. Only Cisco’s fixed release does that. But this bug was exploited before a patch existed, and Cisco warns that attackers with root can wipe the evidence on the box. So the real question was never “how fast did you patch”. It was how fast did anyone notice a fake API user, a new admin or an odd upload from the NAC. That is the gap PrahiX ORA is built to close. ISE syslog, switch and firewall configuration, flow records and identity signals all land in one place, and RAYA AI turns them into one incident with its cause.

Illustrative animation. Left: four separate consoles each see a fragment of the ISE compromise and nobody connects them. Right: the same signals flow into PrahiX ORA, RAYA AI correlates them into one incident with its cause, and a playbook ends the session and blocks the source after approval. WITHOUT ORA · 4 CONSOLES WITH PRAHIX ORA · ONE INCIDENT ISE admin UINo failed logins: the UI was bypassed ISE API gateway log“dummyuser” session · nobody reads it NOC monitorSwitch auth policy changed · no ticket FirewallLarge upload from ISE to external IP 1 4 1 Rogue admin found weeks later. ISE syslog Switch config Firewall/flow Identity/admins ORA + RAYA AI P1 · ONE CORRELATED INCIDENT API session by non-existent user → new admin → policy diff → upload out. Cause: CVE-2026-76460 Session ended · source blocked ✓ Approved by SOC lead Illustrative scenario based on Cisco’s published indicators
Same attack, two outcomes. On the left, four tools each see a fragment. On the right, ORA correlates them and RAYA contains the attack. Illustrative scenario.

Stage by stage: what ORA would have done

What the attacker didWhat ORA and RAYA do
Before: unpatched ISE and ISE-PIC nodes, management and API reachable from too many networksIngest + awareness. Agentless discovery (SNMP, SSH, REST APIs) puts every node and its version on the Central Console. GRC tracks advisories, and CERT-In advisories are auto-ingested into threat intelligence, so “which ISE nodes are still unpatched?” has an answer the day Cisco publishes.
Initial access: crafted API request as a user that was never createdCorrelate. ISE syslog arrives within 10 seconds, alongside everything else. A Sigma detection mapped to MITRE ATT&CK flags API sessions from users that don’t exist (Cisco’s own dummyuser indicator), and IOC matching from 10+ threat-intel feeds recognises known scanning sources.
Takeover: rogue admins, policy changesConfiguration snapshots and diffs on the switches and firewalls ISE controls show what changed, where and when, even if the logs on ISE itself have been wiped. UEBA scores the new admin behaviour as high risk.
Data out: uploads from ISE to external IPsFlow records from your firewalls are independent evidence that the attacker can’t erase from ISE. Attack storylines join the API anomaly, the admin change and the outbound flow into one kill chain.
ContainmentRespond. RAYA runs the containment you allowed: end the unusual admin session, block the source address, revoke tokens. An approval gate sits on anything disruptive, and every step lands in one immutable audit trail, which is the evidence a forensic-triage requirement asks for.
After: regulator and Board questionsGRC starts the breach clocks when the incident is logged (CERT-In 6 hours, DP Board 72 hours) and drafts reports mapped to CERT-In, DPDP, RBI, SEBI CSCRF and IRDAI. Evolve: each outcome makes the next response faster.
How PrahiX ORA, Uni and RAYA AI would contain Cisco ISE CVE-2026-76460: see, detect, trace, contain
Four stages of the attack, four documented PrahiX capabilities.

What’s inside PrahiX ORA

ORA platform

Collects every signal from any vendor or format, ties it to an asset, site and user, and runs four automatic steps: Ingest → Correlate → Respond → Evolve.

RAYA AI

The agent inside ORA. It joins related alerts into one incident with a root cause, self-heals within your limits and rolls back a failed fix. It also warns 15–45 minutes before users feel a problem and writes a plain-language morning summary.

Central Console & Dashboards

Every site, device and service live on one screen. Role-based views and a library of ready-made dashboards let you go from a chart to an incident, device or log line in one click.

GRC

Tracks CERT-In, DPDP Act, RBI, SEBI CSCRF, IRDAI, ISO 27001 and more. It shows what’s due and what’s missing, and produces sealed evidence and ready-to-submit reports.

PrahiX Uni

Monitoring, AIOps, SIEM, SOAR and self-healing in one product: Sigma detections mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, UEBA, attack storylines, deception, playbooks with approval gates and 180 days of searchable logs.

PrahiX Data Protection

Finds personal data (14 Indian identifiers) and stops leakage across 12 channels. It also tracks every DPDP Act clock, with 62 controls on one scorecard.

Integrations

REST APIs and webhooks to the tools you already run. Parser Lab adds any source in any format, and detections and playbooks are kept as version-controlled code.

Built for India

Multi-tenant from one site to 100+ client tenants, with India compliance built in plus CIS v8, NIST CSF, PCI-DSS, HIPAA, ISO 27001 and SOC 2 mappings. Made in India.

70%less alert noise, up to (PrahiX figure)
15–45 minearly warning before users feel it
65%faster to find the cause, up to
10 slog freshness · 180 days retained

The honest bottom line

ORA would not have patched ISE, and it couldn’t have stopped an exploit that existed before the fix. What it would have done is turn the first fake API user into a P1 incident with its cause already written. It would also have kept independent evidence, in flow records and config diffs, that an attacker with root on ISE can’t wipe, and contained the session before policy and admin accounts were rewritten. The iACLs and the patch still belong to your team. ORA makes sure you are never the last to know. P J Networks is an implementation partner for PrahiX, and we run ORA deployments end to end. Book an ORA demo with us.

07The India angle

ISE is common in Indian banks, insurers, large IT parks and PSUs, often because a regulator asked for proper NAC and ISE was the default choice. Those same entities live under RBI’s cyber framework, SEBI’s CSCRF or IRDAI’s guidelines, and all of them must report incidents to CERT-In within six hours. A compromised NAC is exactly the incident you want to discover yourself, with your own logs, rather than from a third party. Singapore’s CSA issued its own alert (AL-2026-126). Regional regulators are watching this one.

08Frequently asked questions

Is Cisco ISE CVE-2026-76460 being actively exploited?

Yes. Cisco’s PSIRT said it was aware of active exploitation when it published the advisory on 16 September 2026, and CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the same day. CrowdSec logged 311 unique attacking IPs between 28 October and 2 November.

Is CVE-2026-76423 exploited too?

Not as far as Cisco knows. Its advisory says the PSIRT is not aware of malicious use. It’s still a CVSS 10.0 admin-access bypass, and the same fixed releases close it, so patch both together.

Which Cisco ISE versions fix CVE-2026-76460?

3.1 Patch 12, 3.2 Patch 11, 3.3 Patch 12, 3.4 Patch 7 and 3.5 Patch 4. ISE 3.0 is past end of software maintenance and gets no fix. Migrate to a supported release.

How do I check whether my ISE was compromised?

On every node, run “show logging application ise-kong/access.log | include dummyuser” and search the API gateway access logs in a debug support bundle for unexpected usernames. Then check firewall and flow logs for uploads from ISE to external IPs. If anything looks suspicious, Cisco recommends re-imaging and restoring from configuration backup.

Want a second pair of eyes on your ISE deployment?

My team at P J Networks can verify patch levels across every node, run the access-log and flow-log hunt, tighten management-plane ACLs on your firewalls, and plan the move off 3.1/3.2, so your NAC stays the gatekeeper and not the way in.

Request a security assessment →

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